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ABSTRACT 
 
Family businesses are an important part of the world economy (Anderson & Reeb, 2003) and 
differ considerably from non-family firms with regard to corporate governance. However, despite 
their difference, family businesses have received relatively little research attention. Our study 
contributes to this growing research by empirically investigating the relationship between family 
shareholding and audit pricing. Using a sample of 3,291 firm-year observations of major U.S. 
listed companies, for the 2006–2008 period, our results demonstrate that audit fees are negatively 
associated with family shareholding after taking into account time-varying effects and industry 
effects as well as traditional control variables. The empirical results are robust to alternative 
family shareholding measures and estimation model specifications. Our results are consistent with 
the convergence-of-interests hypothesis suggesting that family firms face lower 
manager/shareholders agency costs. Auditors charge lower fees for family firms because of lower 
information asymmetry and risk given that the controlling family is well informed about the firm 
and is better able to monitor managerial decisions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
rior research posits that family ownership is both prevalent and substantial. Even in the United States, 
where ownership is relatively dispersed (La Porta et al., 1999), Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that 
families are present in one-third of S&P 500 and account for 18 percent of outstanding equity. Also 
recent research documents that family firms present significant differences from non-family businesses across many 
accounting dimensions including information asymmetry, earnings quality, corporate governance, firm value, and 
performance (Lennox, 2005; Dechun, 2006; Ali et al., 2007; Chau & Gray, 2010). Indeed, compared to non-family 
firms, family firms exhibit lower principal-agent (i.e. manager vs. shareholders) agency costs and higher principal-
principal (i.e., controlling vs. minority shareholders) agency costs (Ali et al., 2007). Auditing being an agency cost 
borne by the shareholders to reduce information asymmetry (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), these characteristics are 
likely to influence audit effort and risk premium. Surprisingly, despite the importance of family businesses 
worldwide and the substantial differences between family and non-family firms, there has been very limited research 
on family businesses in auditing (Trotman & Trotman, 2010). Our study investigates whether auditors are sensitive 
to these agency problems by examining the relation between audit fees and family shareholding. 
 
Prior research documents that family firms face lower principal–agent conflicts than firms with diffuse 
ownership. First, a controlling family is well informed about firm decisions since family members participate in the 
management or serve as directors on the board (Chen et al., 2008). Second, families have less diversified portfolios 
and large blocks of shares, giving them strong incentives to monitor managers, in turn reducing potential manager 
opportunism. Third, families have good knowledge about their firms’ activities, which enables them to better 
monitor managers (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Previous studies suggest a substitution effect between internal 
corporate governance control and external auditing; hence, better internal control should be associated with lower 
audit fees. These previous developments suggest that family shareholding negatively influences audit fees. Other 
research shows that family-owned firms have higher earnings quality, as proxied by lower abnormal accruals and 
greater earnings informativeness (Wang, 2006). Therefore, the demand for assurance that the financial statements do 
not include significant errors is expected to be weak in family firms. 
P 
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On the other hand, family firms suffer from more severe principal–principal conflicts. A controlling family 
is likely to have an effective control over the firm through a high percentage of voting rights and board positions. 
This control gives the family power to seek private benefits at the expense of other shareholders, in turn increasing 
the agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders. Also, family shareholders can extract private 
benefits more easily if the firm’s board of directors is dominated by family members. In that case, the family can 
wield considerable influence on, among other aspects, the choice of the other board members (Hope et al., 2012). Ho 
and Wong (2001) argue that the monitoring of a board’s effectiveness could be impaired when its composition is 
determined by family members. Other studies document that the effectiveness of audit committees is significantly 
reduced when family members are present on corporate boards (Jaggi & Leung, 2007). Khalil et al. (2008) posit that 
auditors need to increase the scope of their audit for firms with high agency conflicts because of increased audit risk 
(inherent and/or audit risk) and auditor business risk (litigation risk). Hence, auditors charge higher audit fees for 
family firms to cover supplemental audit cost. 
 
We use regression analyses on 1,131 U.S. non-financial listed companies in the 2006–2008 period to 
examine the relation between audit fees and family shareholding. Consistent with the first hypothesis, regression 
results show (1) a negative relationship between audit fees and family ownership and (2) a negative relationship 
between audit fees and the presence of a family controlling shareholder. Our results are robust after taking into 
account time-varying, industry effects as well as traditional control variables (e.g., audit costs, client-specific 
litigation risk, Big 4 fee premium, busy season effect, and audit demand effect). These findings are consistent with 
lower principal–agent (manager vs. shareholders) agency costs in family firms as well as with Ali et al. (2007)’s 
results concerning family firms’ disclosures. They suggest that the effect of the reduced manager–shareholders 
agency problem dominates the potential increase in the principal–principal agency problem with regard to audit fees. 
 
As the United States has traditionally been considered as one of the countries with the most dispersed 
ownership (La Porta et al., 1999), very little research examines family firms in the U.S. context. However, recent 
studies show that family businesses are an important part of the U.S. economy (Holderness, 2009). Our study brings 
new evidence on how auditors assess risk in family firms and respond to a prior call for research on auditing family 
businesses (Trotman & Trotman, 2010; Ben Ali & Lesage, 2012). We also contribute to corporate governance 
research in evidencing the prevalence of principal-agent conflict compared to principal-principal conflict in 
determining audit pricing for family firms. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section (Section II) presents the research design and Section III 
provides the sample selection procedures and descriptive statistics. Regressions results are disclosed in Section IV, 
with robustness analyses reported in Section V. Finally we summarize the main findings and conclude in Section VI. 
 
II. MODEL 
 
The seminal model of Simunic (1980) includes two components: audit effort and risk premium: 
 
AUDFEE = p*q + E(Loss) 
 
Where AUDFEE is the amount of audit fees, q: number of auditing hours, p: hourly pricing, E(Loss): risk premium, 
assessing the probability of loss exposure after the audit engagements. 
 
The first component (p*q) of the model represents the audit effort needed and is based on the inherent risk 
and the control risk. The inherent risk represents the risk that a significant error exists in the financial statements, 
while the control risk is the risk that the firm-internal control could not detect it. Hence, auditors charge higher audit 
fees for firms with a higher risk level to compensate their effort. Firms with higher/lower agency problems are likely 
to have higher/lower audit fees. The second component of the Simunic model: E(Loss) deals with risk premium. 
Auditing research has extensively examined litigation risk, which is defined as the risks of incurring liability 
payments and damaged reputation by audit firms for signing financial statements with errors. 
 
As previously established, family shareholding mitigates the agency conflict between manager and 
shareholders and negatively influences audit fees. Therefore we develop two hypotheses. The first hypothesis (H1) 
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states that audit fees are negatively associated with family shareholding. However, family firms face higher agency 
conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders, suggesting higher audit fees. Our second hypothesis (H2) 
states that audit fees are positively associated with family shareholding. 
 
We use the following regression model to test our hypotheses: 
 
AUDFEEit = 0 + 1 FAMit + 

10
1k
δk CONTROLit + Fixed effects + it 
 
Where AUDFEE is defined by the natural logarithm of audit fees (in k$) and CONTROL denotes firm-specific 
variables. The test variable for H1 and H2 is FAM (family shareholding), which we proxy with two different 
measures: CAPFAM and FAMILY_3. CAPFAM represents the ownership of family blockholders, while 
FAMILY_3 is a dummy variable that takes 1 if there is a family shareholder between the top three top blockholders, 
and 0 otherwise. The coefficient on FAM (1) captures the audit fee discount/premium in the case of family 
shareholding. We expect (1) 1 to be negative if the principal–agent conflict dominates the principal–principal 
conflict or (2) 1 to be positive in the case of the prevalence of principal–principal conflict. 
 
Consistent with the Simunic model (1980), our audit fees model includes two types of firm-specific control 
variables, which control for (1) audit costs (size and complexity) and (2) the risk premium. Size is coded by SIZE 
(natural logarithm of total assets expressed in k$). We proxy for client complexity using INVREC (sum of 
inventories and receivables, scaled by total sales), LOGNBS (natural log of (number of business segments+1)) and 
INTPCT (percentage of international sales). To measure the client-specific litigation risk, we include LOSS 
(potential firm loss), LEV (firm leverage), and ROA (Return On Assets). We also include the audit firm size (BIG) 
to capture the Big 4 premium (Hay et al., 2006) and the busy season (YEAR_PEAK) to capture the auditor’s peak 
activity at December 31 (Hay et al., 2006). We also control for the industry in which the client is operating and 
include BTM (Book-to-Market ratio) to assess the audit demand effect. All model specifications include year-fixed 
effects and industry-fixed effects. 
 
III. SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATICTICS 
 
Table 1 describes the sample selection process. Our sample was initially composed of all U.S. listed firms 
(family and non-family firms) for which audit fees data are provided by Worldscope over the 2006–2008 period: 
10,461 observations. We lost 2,943 observations because of missing data on shareholding and 882 observations due 
to missing values on other independent variables. We also dropped financial institutions (2,353 observations) and 
excluded 23 observations relative to OTC (over-the-counter). Finally, we excluded firms with no controlling 
shareholder (controlling shareholder being defined as owning at least 10% of cash flow rights): 969 observations. 
Our final sample is therefore composed of 3,291 firm-year observations. All our variables are winsorised at 1 
percent. 
 
Table 1: Sample Selection 
Nb. of observations with no missing values on audit fees for  2006-2008 10,461 
less: missing values on shareholding 2,943 
less: missing values on other independent variables 882 
less: nb. of observations from financial institutions (SIC: 6000-6999) 2,353 
less: nb. of observations from US OTC market or missing data on listing market (a) 23 
less: nb. of observations for non-controlled firms (at least there is a shareholder owning 10% of cash flows (b)) 969 
Total Data 3,291 
(a) U.S. OTC market requirements are lower for auditors (Leuz et al., 2008). (b) Following La Porta et al. (1999), we consider 10% ownership 
level to define the controlling shareholders. 
 
Similarly to Anderson and Reeb (2003), we notice that prior research presents poor definitions of family 
firms and provides limited guidance on how to ascertain family firms. However, although many studies did not give 
precise details on how to proxy family firms, most studies consider firms in which founders or their family members 
are blockholders to be family firms (Ali et al., 2007; Chau & Gray, 2010; Ho & Fei, 2013). We define firms as being 
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family firms when one of the top three major blockholders is a member of the founding family. We use the Thomson 
ONE Banker database to identify the nature of a blockholder. 
 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of key variables. Audit fees range between $190,000 and $44 million 
and are, on average, over $3 million. Our sample consists of 21.7% of family-controlled firms that have on average 
5.317% of cash flow rights. We find that family shareholding ranges between 0% and 69.99%. Finally, Table 2 
shows the broad range of control variables, which illustrates the diversity of the selected firms within our sample. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
No. of observations Median Mean Minimum Maximum 
AUDIT FEES  3,291 1,746 3,618 190 44,208 
FAMILY_3 3,291 0 0.217 0 1 
CAPFAM 3,291 0 5.317 0 69.99 
SIZE 3,291 13.824 14.028 11.416 18.678 
INVREC 3,291 0.245 0.256 0.022 0.748 
INTPCT 3,291 0.22 0.284 0 0.993 
LOGNBS 3,291 1.099 1.083 0.693 2.197 
LOSS 3,291 0 0.17 0 1 
ROA 3,291 6.303 5.194 -38.888 32.072 
LEV 3,291 0.202 0.217 0 0.708 
BTM 3,291 0.429 0.482 0.044 1.467 
BIG 3,291 1 0.871 0 1 
YEAR_PEAK 3,291 1 0.598 0 1 
The variables are defined as follows: AUDIT FEES = audit fee in thousands of U.S dollars; FAMILY_3 = 1 if there is a family shareholder 
between the top three major blockholders, 0 otherwise; CAPFAM = % of family shareholders cash flow rights on total cash flow rights; SIZE = 
natural log of assets in thousands of U.S dollars; INVREC = sum of inventories and receivables divided by total sales; INTPCT = foreign sales 
divided by total sales; LOGNBS = Log (number of business segments+1); LOSS = 1 if a firm reports a loss; ROA = return on assets; LEV = ratio 
of year-end total debt to total assets; BTM = book-to-market ratio; BIG = 1 if a firm uses one of the big 4 auditors, 0 otherwise; YEAR_PEAK = 
1 if firm i ends its fiscal year end at December 31, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Table 3 discloses the correlation matrix of the dependent variable: AUDFEE (natural logarithm of audit 
fees (in k$)) and the whole set of independent variables. This matrix shows that AUDFEE is negatively and 
significantly correlated at 1% to family ownership (CAPFAM), the presence of a family-controlling shareholder 
(FAMILY_3), and book-to-market (BTM) and at 5% to the occurrence of a loss (LOSS). AUDFEE is also positively 
and significantly correlated at 1% to client size (SIZE), inventories and receivables (INVREC), international sales 
(INTPCT), business segments (LOGNBS), leverage (LEV) and audit quality (BIG). The direction of correlations is 
consistent with prior research on control variables and support the alignment effect developed in our first hypothesis. 
However, we must run the multivariate analysis before reaching any conclusion on the relations. The correlation 
between the two measures of family shareholding (CAPFAM and FAMILY_3) equals 0.773 and is significant at 
1%. However, these two variables are presented in two different model specifications in the next section. Except for 
the correlation between the two performance measures (ROA and LOSS), the magnitudes of the pairwise 
correlations among control variables do not exceed 0.4. Hence, we may have no multicollinearity concerns. 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
 
AUDFEE CAPFAM FAMILY_3 SIZE INVREC INTPCT LOGNBS LOSS ROA LEV BTM BIG YEAR_PEAK 
AUDFEE 1.00 
            
CAPFAM -0.303*** 1.00 
           
FAMILY_3 -0.276*** 0.773*** 1.00 
          
SIZE 0.801*** -0.303*** -0.275*** 1.00 
         
INVREC 0.066*** 0.00 -0.02 -0.031* 1.00 
        
INTPCT 0.398*** -0.160*** -0.143*** 0.240*** 0.293*** 1.00 
       
LOGNBS 0.367*** -0.084*** -0.075*** 0.316*** 0.084*** 0.106*** 1.00 
      
LOSS -0.038** -0.03 -0.056*** -0.114*** 0.03 0.01 -0.082*** 1.00 
     
ROA 0.02 0.040** 0.060*** 0.083*** -0.050*** 0.01 0.049*** -0.730*** 1.00 
    
LEV 0.183*** -0.062*** -0.071*** 0.290*** -0.067*** -0.080*** 0.082*** 0.092*** -0.184*** 1.00 
   
BTM -0.054*** 0.033* 0.02 -0.032* 0.071*** -0.056*** 0.038** 0.165*** -0.278*** 0.02 1.00 
  
BIG 0.363*** -0.254*** -0.223*** 0.327*** -0.098*** 0.132*** 0.076*** 0.00 0.00 0.082*** -0.110*** 1.00 
 
YEAR_PEAK 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.049*** -0.044** -0.02 0.051*** 0.059*** -0.036** 0.149*** -0.048*** -0.01 1.00 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01;  N = 3,291 
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IV. RESULTS 
 
Table 4 presents the regression results. All tables presented here report the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimates for the models discussed above. P-values are computed using robust standard errors. We include a fixed-
year effect and a fixed industry effect in all regressions. 
 
Table 4: Regression Results 
 
Pred. signs b/se p b/se p 
CAPFAM n/d 
  
-0.002** 0.015 
    
-0.001 
 
FAMILY_3 n/d -0.058** 0.021 
  
  
-0.025 
   
SIZE + 0.509*** 0.000 0.508*** 0.000 
  
-0.008 
 
-0.008 
 
INVREC + 0.140 0.094 0.142 0.089 
  
-0.084 
 
-0.084 
 
INTPCT + 0.590*** 0.000 0.588*** 0.000 
  
-0.039 
 
-0.040 
 
LOGNBS + 0.327*** 0.000 0.327*** 0.000 
  
-0.027 
 
-0.027 
 
LOSS + 0.105*** 0.006 0.107*** 0.005 
  
-0.038 
 
-0.038 
 
ROA - -0.003 0.050 -0.003 0.053 
  
-0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
LEV + -0.032 0.594 -0.029 0.626 
  
-0.060 
 
-0.060 
 
BTM - -0.090** 0.016 -0.089** 0.017 
  
-0.037 
 
-0.037 
 
BIG + 0.280*** 0.000 0.277*** 0.000 
  
-0.032 
 
-0.032 
 
YEAR_PEAK + -0.016 0.453 -0.015 0.480 
  
-0.021 
 
-0.021 
 
_cons 
 
-0.623*** 0.001 -0.614*** 0.001 
  
 
-0.187 
 
-0.187 
 
Year effects  
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Industry effects  
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Number of observations 
 
3,291 
 
3,291 
 
Adj.R2 
 
0.732 
 
0.732 
 
p-value 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed) 
 
Table 4 shows the results of applying our audit fee model. Consistent with prior research, our model 
explains approximately 73% of the variation in audit fees. With the exception of INVREC, LEV, ROA, and 
YEAR_PEAK, all variables are at least significant at the 5% level. We find a negative significant association 
between audit fees and (1) CAPFAM (coeff.: -0.002, p < 0,051) and (2) FAMILY_3 (coeff.: -0.058, p < 0,05). This 
validates our first hypothesis. These results suggest that after controlling for other risk factors, auditors consider 
agency conflicts in determining audit fees. The negative coefficients of the two family variables support prior 
research. Indeed, “compared to non-family firms, family firms face less severe hidden-action and hidden-
information agency problems due to the separation of ownership and management” (Ali et al., 2007). Auditors 
charge lower audit fees because of reduced effort and risk when auditing family firms. As previously developed, two 
arguments exist for a negative (alignment effect) or a positive (entrenchment effect) relation between audit fees and 
family shareholding. Our results confirm that the alignment effect dominates the entrenchment effect of family 
shareholding and are consistent with the findings of Ali et al. (2007). We suggest that the audit fees discount 
resulting from the reduced manager-shareholders agency problem exceeds the audit fees premium resulting from the 
increase of the principal-principal agency problem. 
 
With respect to our predicted signs on control variables, we find a positive and significant relation at the 
1% level between audit fees and (1) size measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, (2) the proportion of 
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international sales, (3) the number of business segments, the occurrence of a loss and (4) the big 4 premium. Table 4 
also reports a negative and significant coefficient of the BTM variable (coeff.: -0.09, p < 0,05). This last result is 
consistent with the audit demand effect. 
 
V. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSES 
 
Given the significance of size in audit fee models (Hay et al., 2006), we also use a second proxy for client 
size: SALES (natural logarithm of sales expressed in k$). Results are qualitatively similar. Table 5 presents the 
regression results and shows that audit fees are negatively associated with (1) family shareholdings (coeff.: -0.003, p 
< 0,01) and (2) the existence of a controlling family (coeff.: -0.087, p < 0,01). These results confirm the expected 
discount of audit fees due to family block-holding. 
 
Table 5: Robustness Analyses 
 
Pred. signs b/se p b/se p 
CAPFAM n/d -0.003*** 0.010 
  
 
 
0.000 
   
FAMILY_3 n/d 
  
-0.087*** 0.010 
 
   
-0.030 
 
LOGSALES + 0.506*** 0.000 0.507*** 0.000 
 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.010 
 
INVREC + 0.604*** 0.000 0.602*** 0.000 
 
 
-0.130 
 
-0.130 
 
INTPCT + 0.713*** 0.000 0.716*** 0.000 
 
 
-0.060 
 
-0.060 
 
LOGNBS + 0.220*** 0.000 0.220*** 0.000 
 
 
-0.040 
 
-0.040 
 
LOSS - 0.060 0.130 0.060 0.150 
 
 
-0.040 
 
-0.040 
 
ROA + -0.006*** 0.000 -0.006*** 0.000 
 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
LEV - 0.258*** 0.000 0.254*** 0.000 
 
 
-0.080 
 
-0.080 
 
BTM + -0.112** 0.020 -0.113** 0.020 
 
 
-0.050 
 
-0.050 
 
BIG + 0.264*** 0.000 0.267*** 0.000 
 
 
-0.050 
 
-0.050 
 
YEAR_PEAK + 0.030 0.330 0.030 0.350 
 
 
-0.030 
 
-0.030 
 
_cons 
 
-0.546 0.060 -0.557 0.050 
  
 
-0.290 
 
-0.290 
 
Year effects Included 
 
Included 
 
Industry effects  
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Number of observations 3,291 
 
3,291 
 
Adj.R2 
 
0.738 
 
0.738 
 
p-value 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed) 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
This study considers the relationship between audit fees and both family control and ownership in the U.S. 
context. Indeed, family firms face lower principal–agent conflict and higher principal–principal conflict compared to 
widely held firms. Our objective is to examine auditors’ sensitivity to agency conflicts in family firms. 
Understanding how auditors charge fees for family firms is important for at least two reasons: (1) Family businesses 
are an important part of the world economy (Anderson & Reeb, 2003); (2) Prior audit studies focused on widely 
held firms despite a call for research on the auditing of family firms (Trotman & Trotman, 2010). 
 
Using a sample of 3,291 firm-year observations of major U.S. listed companies, for the 2006–2008 period, 
we find that audit fees are negatively associated with family cash flow rights and the presence of a controlling 
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family. These results are robust to alternate measures of client size and consider most control variables identified by 
prior research (Choi et al., 2009). Our findings provide an interesting perspective on the determination of audit fees 
as well as on the agency conflicts of family firms, namely that in family firms audit fees include a discount due to 
the decreased agency conflict between manager and shareholders. Consistent with previous studies, family firms 
face higher principal–principal conflicts and lower principal–agent conflicts compared to non-family firms (Ali et 
al., 2007). However, our study posits that when considering the global effect of these two agency conflicts, family 
firms face lower agency problems compared to non-family firms, suggesting that the decrease in manager-
shareholders conflict dominates. 
 
Our research is subject to some limitations. First, following Fan and Wong (2005), we assume that 
controlling and management ownership are stable over the studied period. Second, we focus only on the U.S. 
context, where the market is well-regulated and investors are highly protected. Similarly to the Maury (2006) study, 
we find that family ownership in well-regulated environments does not seem to harm minority shareholders but 
instead profit them. Despite these limits, our findings have implications for policymakers from other institutional 
settings and could serve to encourage them to enforce investor protection. Indeed, by improving minority 
shareholder protection, the efficiency gains from family control generates higher value creation, which can benefit 
all shareholders of a firm. Also, our study contributes to our understanding of the complex relationships between 
audit fees and ownership structure, which remains very limited (Hay et al., 2006; Ben Ali & Lesage, 2012). Future 
research is needed to evaluate the generality of our results in other institutional contexts. 
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